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An Innovative Public–Private Partnership:
New Approach to Development
RAMINA SAMII, LUK N. VAN WASSENHOVE and
SHANTANU BHATTACHARYA *
INSEAD, Fontainebleau, France
Summary. — This paper is focused on the development of new services by nonproﬁt organizations
for groups of companies within a particular sector in industry. It is based on a case study of an
actual implementation by United Nations Industrial Development Organization (UNIDO) in
collaboration with a number of other organizations to upgrade the capabilities of automotive
component suppliers in India, to enable them to supply to world-class manufacturers. We draw
upon the traditional literature available on new product and service development for ﬁrms
introducing new products and services for maximizing proﬁt, and contrast those approaches with
the approach adopted by nonproﬁt organizations. We also carry out a comparative analysis
between UNIDO’s partnership model and the traditional model to highlight the innovation aspects
and advantages of the former from the developmental perspective. An attempt is also made to
illustrate the pre-formation, formation and post-formation challenges faced by the new cooperation
model that envisages the participation of public and private partners.  2002 Elsevier Science Ltd.
All rights reserved.
Key words — nonproﬁt organizations, multidisciplinary public–private partnership, development
model, automotive components industry, Asia, India
1. INTRODUCTION
The need for structured new product devel-
opment and launch is well documented by
Wheelwright and Clark (1992) as well as Ettlie
and Stoll (1990), as ﬁrms that have structured
development processes can plan product de-
velopmentbetter andobtainhigher proﬁts.There
is a growing stream of research on the man-
agement of new product development processes
for maximizing the ﬂow of proﬁt for ﬁrms. As
Karmarkar (1996) shows, successful new prod-
uct development translates directly to higher
revenues for ﬁrms. There have not however
been many studies undertaken on new product
and service development by nonproﬁt organi-
zations, as the relationship between successful
product and services development and the in-
centives for nonproﬁt organizations are not
clearly stated.
Kanter (1999) has studied the drive for in-
novation in for-proﬁt ﬁrms, which also develop
innovation programs for the social sector. She
ﬁnds that many corporations are beginning to
realize that beyond social responsibility, social
programs can enhance the proﬁtability of the
ﬁrm: ‘‘Indeed, a new paradigm of innovation is
emerging: a partnership between private enter-
prise and public interest that produces proﬁt-
able and sustainable change for both sides.’’ 1
She does not however address the social as-
pects of innovation for ﬁrms that operate in the
nonproﬁt context. Fyvie and Ager (1999) study
the innovation processes at NGOs, and ﬁnd that
often they seemingly have the organizational
capabilities needed for successful implementa-
tion of innovative projects in the development
context. But, their potential innovative capaci-
ties are not reﬂected in the project outcome, as
their activities are constrained both by internal
and external factors. One of the key factors
identiﬁed by the authors, which prevents suc-
cessful completion of innovation, is the lack of
a mix of capabilities inherent to proﬁt-based
ﬁrms.
In this paper, we describe the development of
a new service byUNIDO 2 in collaboration with
a number of partners from the private sector,
academic institutions, NGOs, and government
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authorities. We start our analysis by presenting
the organization’s traditional way of delivering
technical assistance. This is followed by a de-
scription of the innovative scheme, the part-
nership model developed by the organization to
address the challenges of globalization faced
by the SMEs of an emerging country in a par-
ticular sector. Before carrying out a compara-
tive analysis of the two models, we describe the
pilot project run under the partnership scheme.
After having covered the innovative aspect of
the model, we describe its relevance to the part-
ners as well as its viability in terms of achieving
its objectives utilizing select parameters. In the
last section, an attempt is made to discuss a
number of pre-formation, formation, and post-
formation features and factors that need to be
taken into consideration in the context of non-
proﬁt multidisciplinary public–private partner-
ships. Our concluding remarks highlight issues
and conditions that aﬀect the replicability of the
model and its sustainability at the organiza-
tional as well as country level.
2. THE TRADITIONAL MODEL
To address the industrial development prob-
lems of developing countries at national or
geographic level, in 1998 UNIDO undertook
a critical review of the organization’s range of
services. The aim of the exercise was to iden-
tify and structure the core competencies of the
organization. To ensure impact at the country
level, small unrelated projects were phased out
in favor of multimillion dollar integrated coun-
try programs addressing the need of a country
over a period of three to ﬁve years. Bearing in
mind the three levels of intervention––policy,
institutional, and enterprise––the organization
came up with a matrix summarizing its range of
services. The matrix of services constitutes the
basis on which the organization formulates its
integrated programs for developing countries
and economies in transition.
Similar to other UN agencies, UNIDO, upon
receipt of an oﬃcial request, initiates a dialogue
with the country to assess its needs. Simulta-
neously, a dialogue is initiated with the donor
community to evaluate funding potential and a
crossfunctional team is set up within the orga-
nization. After securing a political commitment
from the recipient government and an agree-
ment in principle by a donor for funding, the
organization embarks on the design of an in-
tegrated program. With the aim of producing a
catalytic or multiplier eﬀect, the organization
tries to focus its assistance by either building
on a country’s on-going industrial develop-
ment eﬀort or other donor-funded initiatives.
During this phase, it aims to integrate and re-
spond to the needs of the various stakehold-
ers. These stakeholders, with varying degrees
of involvement, are the government (usually the
Ministry of Industry, Trade or Environment), the
counterpart institutions (national or sectoral
associations), end beneﬁciaries (the government
for policy issues, institutions for institutional
capacity building programs, and SMEs for di-
rect assistance), donor country(s), and other
donor agency(s) (Figure 1).
The end result is a technical assistance pro-
gram formulated directly by UNIDO and en-
dorsed by the government and the donor. Once
funding is secured, the program enters into the
implementation phase. UNIDO’s role becomes
that of managing, coordinating and monitoring
the program activities in the ﬁeld. Each mem-
ber of the crossfunctional team is allocated a
budget and is held responsible for the delivery of
a speciﬁc portion of the technical assistance. On
the relationship side, the organization contin-
ues to maintain a dialogue with the stakehold-
ers, informing them regularly on the program’s
progress. In most cases an audit is carried out
by a dedicated team of evaluators (composed of
the major stakeholders and UNIDO) to verify
the soundness of the initiative in terms of timely
execution of activities, expected outputs, and
results.
Figure 1 broadly summarizes the way most
UN specialized agencies operate; it also cate-
gorizes the traditional stakeholders. For ex-
ample, while the UN’s Food and Agriculture
Organization counterpart in the government
is the Ministry of Agriculture and its end ben-
eﬁciaries are the rural population, the World
Health Organization’s counterpart in a country
is the Ministry of Health and its end beneﬁ-
ciaries are the communities and the healthcare
network. Assistance is provided upon receipt
of an oﬃcial request from a national govern-
ment and funding is mobilized from the donor
community. Assistance is extended either di-
rectly by the organization or through host coun-
try institutions.
3. THE PARTNERSHIP MODEL
UNIDO, mindful of its core competencies,
aimed to respond to the new direction set by
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UN secretary-general, Koﬁ Annan, during the
1997 World Economic Forum: ‘‘Strengthening
the partnership between the UN system and the
private sector will be one of the priorities of my
term as the secretary-general.’’ In mid-1998, it
embarked on the task of identifying ways and
means to initiate a dialogue and working rela-
tionship with the private sector.
In pursuit of the fact that ‘‘each country has
to ﬁnd its own recipe for industrialization but
this is not possible without the participation of
private sector actors in the process,’’ 3 UNIDO
developed a comprehensive model that included
the participation of a private sector manufactur-
ing enterprise as well as other players. It pro-
posed to achieve that goal by focusing on the
upgrading and development of an entire sector
in a target country.
The model was a truly multidisciplinary
partnership that sought the active participation
of a multinational corporation, a university, a
civil society organization, the developing coun-
try and its institutions (Figure 2). The inclusion
of new partners had a direct impact on the
project development process, sequence of in-
teractions between the major stakeholders, de-
gree of their involvement as well as the nature
of their relationship. These issues are discussed
at length in the sections to follow. The ﬁnal
objective of UNIDO in developing the new
model was to have a holistic view of challenges
faced by SMEs in developing countries and
economies in transition in the era of global-
ization.
Sagawa and Sega (2000) show an increase over
time of collaborations between nonproﬁt and
proﬁt-based organizations that aim to provide
value for society. Although the collaboration
incentives for these two kinds of organizations
are diﬀerent, they promise substantial mutual
beneﬁts; while proﬁt-based ﬁrms realize the ex-
tent to which their proﬁts depend on a healthy
social environment, nonproﬁt ﬁrms are increas-
ingly ﬁnding that they may have to integrate
successful private sector best practices into
their own practices for eﬃcient operations. They
also found an increase in the breadth of this
interaction over the past, as funding sources
which previously just supported narrow cate-
gories of services are increasingly requiring col-
laboration to help knit together a seamless web
of services.
(a) The pilot project
Following the sequence of interactions be-
tween the partners as illustrated in Figure 2, the
model survived the reality check as UNIDO
managed to attract the interest of a multina-
tional partner, FIAT S.p.A, that brought focus
and an operational perspective to the initiative.
Talks with FIAT gave the project a sectoral
and geographical focus: automotive compo-
nents in India. It also enabled UNIDO to ini-
tiate a targeted search for other partners. The
intent of the organization was to make this
initiative not only a multidisciplinary but also
a truly international one. Mindful of this ob-
jective, INSEAD, the international business
school in Fontainebleau (France) was appro-
ached. Contacts were made with the Prince of
Wales Business Leaders Forum (PWBLF), a
British nongovernmental organization (NGO)
with focus on socially and environmentally
responsible activities. At the national level, the
organization sought the endorsement of the
Figure 1. Generic framework for UN’s technical assistance model. Numbers indicate the sequence in the project’s in-
ception, and implementation process.
INNOVATIVE PUBLIC–PRIVATE PARTNERSHIP 993
government of India. Contacts were also es-
tablished with the two relevant national cate-
gory associations: the Automotive Component
Manufacturers Association (ACMA) and the
Automotive Research Association of India
(ARAI).
The model was conceptualized in August
1998 and by November of the same year,
Memorandum of Understandings (MoUs) were
signed between the organization and the re-
spective partners in the presence of India’s
Ministry of Industry. The event enabled UN-
IDO to meet all its partners and for the part-
ners to meet each other for the ﬁrst time.
Immediately after the forging of the agree-
ment, UNIDO and its partners engaged in de-
ﬁning the technical aspects of the initiative. A
rapid needs assessment mission on the status of
the Indian automotive component industry
organized in December 1998 highlighted the
requirements of the industry and set the stage
for the ﬁrst operational meeting among the
partners.
This partnership of ‘‘unnatural’’ partners was
a novelty for each of the partners. The ﬁrst
meeting, held in New Delhi, India in January
1999, meant to address the lack of suﬃcient
knowledge and understanding about the indi-
vidual organizations forming the partner-
ship as well as the operational objective of
the partnership. This two-day consensus-
building meeting deﬁned the content and mile-
stones of the pilot project for the next 12
months of 1999 and provided the basis for the
elaboration of the program budget. While the
MoUs incorporated substantial in-kind contri-
butions from each partner, a fund-matching
scheme was put into place between UNIDO,
the government of India and FIAT to cover
costs.
The pilot project was to test the viability of
the model and type of assistance provided by the
partners on 20 Indian enterprises. To monitor
changes at the plant level, the partners devised
two sets of impact indicators (IIs): performance
and awareness improvement indicators. Data
originating from these were analyzed and a
document was prepared on the aggregate as well
as enterprise level results. The program’s ﬁrst
phase that ran over a period of one year was
completed by December 1999.
(i) Geographical focus and selection 4
The program was a demonstration case
based on assistance to 20 enterprises in the
western region of India (Pune/Mumbai area). A
selection criterion was formulated to ensure a
representative sample of enterprises in terms of
market value and quality performance (Table
1).
The program was to act as a catalyst in the
tiering process of the automotive component
suppliers. Enterprises meeting the following
criteria were invited for interviews:
—Target group: small and medium tier 1
and 2 enterprises with maximum annual
turnover of US$ ﬁve million.
—Subsectors: metal, rubber and plastics.
—Minimum of two years in operation with
export potential.
—Clear indication of ﬁnancial stability.
—Noncaptive subsuppliers (e.g., at least two
unrelated major customers).
—Committed and motivated management.
The partners, after screening and interview-
ing the short-listed candidates, selected 20
Figure 2. Framework of UNIDO partnership model.
WORLD DEVELOPMENT994
enterprises (February–March 1999). A partici-
pation fee of Rps 20,000 was charged per com-
pany as a sign of commitment.
(ii) Package of assistance (1999)
Each participating enterprise received assis-
tance and participated in the following activi-
ties over a period of eight months:
—10 days shop-ﬂoor assistance on Toyota
Production System provided in three stages
to allow application and absorption over a
six-month period (April–October).
—Five days of classroom training and expe-
rience sharing sessions/seminars (March,
August, December).
—Two national study tours to award-win-
ning (e.g., Deming award) Indian companies
(September and October).
—International exposure for almost half of
the sample group through participation at
an international fair (‘‘EquipAuto’99,’’ Octo-
ber, Paris), bilateral meetings with potential
foreign partners and factory visits in Europe.
—Installment of and training on twoUNIDO
software: ﬁnancial planning and business per-
formance assessment (April and October).
(iii) Partners’ activities (1999–2000)
—Formulation and application of impact
indicators (February, March, August and
October).
—Selection of enterprises (March).
—Selection of international experts (April).
—Preparation and delivery of classroom
training sessions (March, August and De-
cember).
—Midterm review meeting (August).
—Organization of study tours in India and
abroad (September–October).
—Software installation and training (April
and October).
—Data analysis (October–November).
—Presentation of program impact (Decem-
ber).
—Brainstorming session on next phase of
the program (January 2000).
The program’s thrust was to focus primarily
on noncapital as opposed to capital-intensive
process improvements. To have the widest im-
pact and employee outreach and exposure, the
program sought to strike a balance between
classroom and hands-on training at the shop-
ﬂoor level. The national and international
study tours were regarded as a benchmarking
exercise that aimed to provide the participating
companies with a tool to benchmark their per-
formance against world-class Indian and for-
eign manufacturing units. All the activities,
accept the 10-day shopﬂoor assistance, were
delivered by the partners. A team of four in-
ternational experts provided the shopﬂoor as-
sistance.
4. TRADITIONAL VERSUS THE
PARTNERSHIP MODEL
By late 1998, UNIDO had taken the lead
within the UN system by launching the ﬁrst
nonproﬁt private–public partnership. The ini-
tiative was launched under the auspices of
the highest authorities of the respective orga-
nizations and enjoyed high visibility. The
model took full advantage of the core compe-
tencies of a multidisciplinary team to deliver
services in an innovative manner. For the ﬁrst
time, the partners––in order to meet their ob-
jectives and to collect the rewards of their in-
volvement––concurrently tackled development
objectives from four diﬀerent perspectives: com-
mercial, socially responsible, theoretical, and
environmental. By taking a fresh look at long-
standing eﬃciency and structural problems of
Indian SMEs, suppliers of automotive compo-
nents to domestic and foreign car manufactur-
ers, each partner achieved results that could
have been achieved only through a joint col-
laboration scheme. To shed light on the inno-
vative features of the partnership model, we
shall take a close look at the main diﬀerences
between the traditional and partnership model
(Table 2).
The partners that joined the partnership ini-
tiative were a mix of traditional UNIDO part-
ners and newcomers as well as not-for-proﬁt
and for-proﬁt entities. The traditional part-
ners were the government of India (Ministry of
Table 1. Enterprise selection criteria
Automotive com-
ponents industry
ACMA
member
(80%)
NonACMA
member
(20%)
Total
ISO/QS 9000 ‘‘Self-
certiﬁcation’’ (50%)
8 2 10
Noncertiﬁed (50%) 8 2 10
Maximum number
of enterprises
16 4 20
Source: UNIDO (1999c).
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Industry) and the two national counterpart in-
stitutions (NCIs): ACMA and ARAI. The new
partners were the multinational corporation
(FIAT S.p.A.), the private international busi-
ness school (INSEAD) and the British NGO
(PWBLF). Cooperation with a UN organiza-
tion to tackle development issues was an ab-
solute novelty for two of the newcomers: FIAT
S.p.A and INSEAD. The innovative aspect for
the PWBLF, the government of India and the
two national associations with previous expe-
rience of cooperation with the UN and/or the
organization, was that of moving away from
a one-to-one relationship to a partnership ap-
proach. It is worthwhile mentioning that while
the organization could choose from a wide
number of academic institutions, NGOs, and
MNCs, there was less leeway in the selection of
the traditional partners.
The partnership model not only draws upon
new partners but also seeks diversity in terms of
partner objective and line of business. While
the NGO promotes socially responsible behav-
ior in business, the multinational corporation
(MNC) produces goods and aims to maximize
proﬁt for shareholders. The national associa-
tions’ obligation is to provide meaningful ser-
vices to its membership. The business school, to
be in the forefront of education, builds intel-
lectual capital. The government authorities pro-
Table 2. Comparison between the traditional and partnership model
Characteristics Traditional model Partnership model
Level of innovation n.a. Radical: new to the organization and to
the market (partners and end beneﬁciaries)
No. of partners and origin of
request
UNIDO, national counterpart in-
stitution (NCI) upon the request of
national government (usually Min-
istry of Industry)
Traditional partners, multinational corpo-
ration, international university/research
institute, international NGO and endorsed
by national government (usually Ministry
of Industry)
Partner selection Default Default and selected partners
Type of partners Nonproﬁt, public, semi-public and
private NCIs
Nonproﬁt and for-proﬁt, public, semi-
public and private corporations
Line of partner activity Noncompetitors Noncompetitors
Type of cooperation One-to-one Partnership
Ownership structure Independent and voluntary with no
equity exchange between the part-
ners
Independent and voluntary with no equity
exchange between the partners
Visibility Standard High
Type of agreement Project prepared by UNIDO and
signed by UNIDO, the host gov-
ernment and the donor
Personalized bilateral MoUs: umbrella or
project-speciﬁc agreements
Implementation structure Decentralized with UNIDO team
members responsible for speciﬁc
activities operating independently
Centralized with the partnership team,
composed of representatives of each part-
ner organization, operating in full coordi-
nation
In-kind contributions Counterpart organization All partners
Possible funding sources Donors, host country, UNIDO UNIDO, host country, private corpora-
tions, donor
Objective Developmental within the bound-
aries of UNIDO mission
Developmental within the boundaries of
UNIDO mission
Type of assistance Mainly ‘‘oﬀ-the-shelf’’ assistance
based on and built upon past
experiences
‘‘Tailor-made’’ assistance capitalizing on
partners’ complementary assets, knowl-
edge and capability: no precedent to em-
ulate
Market relevance of assistance Low. Assistance formulated in re-
sponse to a political request
High. Assistance formulated and provided
as a response to a market need
Project formulation and
implementation process
––Problem identiﬁcation process Government! UNIDO$ NCI Partners$ Government
–– Solution identiﬁcation process UNIDO & NCI! Government Partners$ Government
Organizational motivations Exploitive and homogeneous Hybrid & heterogenous: explorative and
exploitive
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mote and ensure an equitable industrial devel-
opment in their country. Finally, UNIDO’s
mandate is to make the most eﬃcient use of its
endowments and resources to provide services
to developing countries.
Similar to the traditional model, the partner-
ship model does not envisage any change in the
partners’ ownership structure. In the presence
of no equity exchange, the partners maintain
their status of independence and participate on
a voluntary basis. The management of the ini-
tiative as well as the relationship between the
partners, including that with the end beneﬁ-
ciaries, the SMEs, is centralized within UNIDO
(Figure 3). As a result, the SMEs’ sole inter-
locutor is UNIDO, which becomes responsible
for the seamless delivery of services and assis-
tance provided by the partners. Bearing in mind
the core business of each partner, the MoUs
incorporate high levels of ﬂexibility and outline
varying levels of resource and eﬀort commit-
ment. As an innovative cooperation scheme,
the potential applications of the cooperation
areas covered by the MoUs are uncovered
during the design stage of the technical assis-
tance project while the potential of the model is
unraveled and fully appreciated during the
implementation phase.
Right from the outset, each partner views its
participation as a strategic choice. By taking
ownership of the project, the partners allocate
the required resources to ensure its successful
implementation. As opposed to the traditional
model where the major stakeholders are ‘‘dor-
mant,’’ to ensure timely execution of the pro-
gram, a dedicated partnership team is set up. It
is composed of the most relevant and compe-
tent representatives of each partner organiza-
tion.
The attachment of full-time staﬀ to the ini-
tiative implies direct involvement both in the
daily management of the project and in the de-
sign and delivery of services. Activities that are
traditionally executed by external consultants
are carried out directly by the partners. In this
context, ﬁnancial contributions are regarded as
an additional sign of commitment to the project
as opposed to a substitute for the provision of
technical know-how or sector-speciﬁc knowl-
edge. Strictly from an organizational point of
view, UNIDO considers the voluntary ﬁnancial
contribution by any of the partners as an ad-
ditional and important indication of the market
value of the services provided to end beneﬁ-
ciaries.
As illustrated in Figure 2, by including three
additional partners the partnershipmodel brings
in a new dimension with technical implications.
In the traditional model, depending on the
sectoral focus of the project, UNIDO works
uniquely with the same national public, semi-
public or private sector institutions over the
years. The partnership model creates new learn-
ing opportunities as the number of partners is
extended to newcomers. The multiple cross-
organizational exchange of ideas creates syn-
ergies that lead to the adoption of innovative
solutions and approaches. While the ultimate
objective of the program is deﬁned by UNIDO,
within the boundaries of its mandate, the
partnership aims to address a set of inherent
industry-related problems from diﬀerent per-
spectives. The enhanced interaction and the
unique opportunity to leverage on each part-
ner’s perspective, knowledge and capability are
achieved at no additional cost to the project.
To capitalize on the partners’ knowledge assets
as well as to accommodate the goals of each
partner, the partnership arrangement lends it-
self to the formulation of a ‘‘tailor-made’’
project. Traditional projects are more of an
‘‘of-the-shelf’’ product that leverage on past ex-
perience during the formulation and implemen-
tation phases.
Figure 3. Nodal managing structure.
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The most striking diﬀerence between the
traditional and the partnership model, how-
ever, lies in the degree of interaction and inte-
gration of market information and orientation
during the project formulation and implemen-
tation process. While the traditional model is
largely insulated from direct access to such in-
formation, the partnership model, through its
domestic and foreign private sector partners,
relies heavily on the full incorporation of mar-
ket knowledge and perspectives in the process.
Indeed, it is the partners who jointly design and
formulate the scope, duration, activities, goals
and milestones of the project pursuing a con-
sensus-building logic. Contrary to the tradi-
tional model, where there is a risk of providing
outdated or irrelevant assistance to an industry
or sector, in the partnership model this risk is
drastically reduced given the participation of a
market leader.
Parameters relevant to the two models are
the need to keep a cap on costs and to ensure
development and delivery of quality products
and services. The traditional model, capitaliz-
ing on past experiences, follows a well-estab-
lished path for the project development and
implementation process that is in line with the
consolidated operational guidelines developed
by the organization. The partnership model,
lacking such a blueprint, follows a diﬀerent
path as its processes and deliverables are de-
veloped and formulated during the project it-
self. Speciﬁcally, the partners are ﬁrst identiﬁed,
in conjunction with the broad objectives of the
program, and only then are deliverables of the
project (discussed among the partners) deﬁned.
This is in contrast with the traditional model
whereby deliverables are identiﬁed almost sin-
gle-handedly and upfront by the organization.
Another major diﬀerence between the two
models is in the approach toward division of
responsibilities. In the partnership model, once
the project targets are set, responsibilities (re-
viewed periodically) are divided among the
partners as opposed to the traditional approach
that sets them almost in stone during the pro-
ject formulation stage subsequently endorsed
by the organization, the recipient country and
the donor(s). In short, the partnership ap-
proach provides UNIDO with the ﬂexibility of
setting soft targets in the beginning, and then
hardening them towards the end as clariﬁcation
emerges about the resources that each partner
could oﬀer, the market conditions, and other
key pieces of feedback. This corresponds to
Bacon, Beckman, Mowery, and Wilson (1994)
deﬁnition of ﬂuid product deﬁnition where the
product development process is known with
only a modicum of certainty when the project
concept phase is begun, and the deﬁnition so-
lidiﬁes as the project progresses. In an alliance
framework, this often makes for better practice,
as it delivers more accurate information that
may be available with the partners, and also
enables the partnership to provide a wider set
of services using a wider skill set from the
partners.
Another major diﬀerence between the two
models lies in the project formulation and im-
plementation schedule. By broadly and quickly
leveraging on the diverse knowledge and ca-
pability base of its partners, the partnership
approach drastically reduces and improves the
project formulation and delivery process. The
ability to ‘‘mix-and-match’’ partner expertise
provides the partnership model with the ﬂexi-
bility to choose from a wider range of services
and speed up their introduction––‘‘quick-con-
nect’’––into the program. As a result, the
agreement moves into its implementation phase
almost immediately after the signing of the
personalized bilateral MoUs. Immediate im-
plementation becomes possible for activities
traditionally requiring funding given the in-
kind contributions of each partner. Concur-
rently, pressure from the partners ensures that
fund raising eﬀorts are on a ‘‘fast-track.’’ Tra-
ditional projects follow a diﬀerent pattern and
logic: UNIDO proposes the content of the
project that is then reviewed and signed oﬀ by
the donor and the host country. The prepara-
tory phase, sketching the activities of the pro-
ject, may remain on the drawing board for long
stretches of time awaiting internal (UNIDO) or
external (stakeholders) approval. A gestation
period may follow the approval stage until
funding is secured.
Given the availability of specialized skills and
competencies among the partners, the manag-
ing structure, and participation in the design
of the project, the partnership model sup-
ports high degrees of activity integration and
coordination as tasks are implemented both
sequentially and in parallel. In the traditional
model, each team member is responsible for
the design and implementation of its own com-
ponent. To reduce complexity, team mem-
bers operating in their ﬁefdom opt, at best, for
a ‘‘patch-work’’ approach. To align and seek
interfaces becomes a far-fetched objective be-
tween ‘‘unrelated’’ activities delivered by indi-
vidual team members.
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The management process in the traditional
model is characterized by delayed linear, for-
mal, and highly hierarchical feedback mecha-
nisms. The partnership model enjoys timely,
cyclical and informal feedback mechanisms due
to the existence of a formal partnership team
empowered to make decisions and the in-built
market feedback mechanisms brought in by the
partners. A move from one-to-one relationship
to a partnership and consensus-building logic
also entails equal redistribution of negotiating
power among the members.
The partnership’s objectives can be described
in the context of what Koza and Lewin (2000)
refer to as explorative and exploitive objectives:
explorative as it is a learning experience to test
the viability of the approach and model toward
the achievement of developmental as well as
individual goals; exploitive in that it aims to
achieve program-wide business objectives in
terms of enhancing the performance of the In-
dian automotive component manufacturers by
structuring the industrial network toward global
standards as well as partner-speciﬁc objectives.
Partnerships cannot substitute for good inter-
nal operations of any organization. From the
explorative perspective, they can complement
and enhance such operations or provide an
impetus for improvement as alternative opera-
tional practices are introduced and put in
practice. In the traditional model, the exploitive
objectives can be deﬁned as homogeneous as
compared to their heterogeneous nature in the
partnership model.
5. MODEL VIABILITY
UN specialized agencies aim to address mar-
ket failures that lead to development disparities.
UNIDO, dealing with industrial development,
tackles inherent industry-wide problems in
speciﬁc countries and geographical areas. The
type of assistance provided by UNIDO is po-
tentially relevant to private corporations with
long-term interests in developing countries or
economies in transition. A private sector com-
pany does not have the expertise or the resources
to address long-term development issues vital
for its competitive performance on these mar-
kets. Hence, the partnership model becomes
particularly attractive to MNCs as it involves a
concerted eﬀort, by a number of parties with
vested interest, to tackle long-term devel-
opment issues. Even though the partnership
is not to be considered as a replacement for
MNC-speciﬁc activities and eﬀorts in an
emerging market it becomes an additional in-
strument.
More speciﬁcally, the partnership model is
particularly eﬀective in tackling supply chain
issues. In the long run, the MNC can reap ﬁ-
nancial beneﬁts by locally sourcing its input
requirements. From the SMEs’ perspective, the
participation of an MNC is a clear indication of
the marketability of the goods they produce. It
also constitutes an assurance that assistance
provided will adequately reﬂect the needs and
requests of a generic major buyer. Host gov-
ernments value the partnership model as it is
viewed as a vehicle through which market op-
portunities are created for domestic SMEs. In
the medium term, these opportunities may lead
to signiﬁcant import-substitutions (with conse-
quences for the balance of payments) as the
percentage of components sourced locally by
MNCs increases. The national counterpart in-
stitutions through their participation in the
partnership gain an insight to the most recent
trends aﬀecting their sector. By integrating this
insight into their services, they can guide and
lead their members during transition phases.
The NGO stands to gain from its participation
in the partnership from two perspectives:
qualitative and quantitative. The partnership
model creates a multiplier eﬀect given the
number of enterprises and institutions involved.
In qualitative terms, the NGO’s outreach goes
beyond large corporations in developed coun-
tries by way of its extension to SMEs in de-
veloping countries. The academic institution by
observing the realities of operating in develop-
ing countries is provided with a testing ground
for existing business theories as well as access to
data and information that may lead to the
preparation of new pedagogical material. The
only drawback to this conceptually sound
model grounded on solid foundations is the
way it may be perceived by the donor com-
munity. Businesses’ motivation in contributing
to social and development projects are often
regarded with suspicion. From the funding
perspective, the organization (UNIDO) has to
ensure that its member countries, particularly
the donors, feel comfortable associating them-
selves with programs that envisage the partici-
pation of for-proﬁt MNCs. Donors, looking
for ‘‘safe’’ projects to fund, need to be assured
that they are not distorting the market by ﬁ-
nancing activities of big corporations with busi-
ness interests in developing countries. Funding
should be channeled toward projects that have
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a sectoral as opposed to enterprise-speciﬁc
outreach. In this context, provision of a frame-
work for such partnerships becomes extremely
relevant. In order to increase the number and
success probability of partnerships with the
business community, the UN as a system should
be encouraged to proceed with its intent to es-
tablish precise guidelines to be reviewed regu-
larly, to ensure harmony between partnership
objectives and core UN principles.
From the operational point of view, the new
model’s objective is (a) to think in develop-
mental terms incorporating market, theoretical,
environmental and socially responsible per-
spectives; (b) work in partnership with private
and public partners and (c) assist and prepare
SMEs in their eﬀort to be part of global supply
chains. In this new paradigm, the diversity of
the partner expertise and experience has to re-
sult in a higher value service to end beneﬁcia-
ries. At the same time, activities should be
focused on results: measurable outcomes and
demonstrable change.
Chen and Li (1999) have shown that process
learning from functionally diﬀerent organiza-
tions as well as content learning that is tech-
nological in nature, positively help new product
development in an alliance. They also found
that ﬁrm-speciﬁc content learning in manufac-
turing and marketing areas do not help new
product or service development in an alliance.
This evidence is borne out in our case study as
well. The fundamental expertise provided by
the partners in their technological areas––e.g.,
knowledge of supply chains from the academic
partner and social responsibility from the NGO
partner––was very useful for the success of the
project and highly appreciated by the end
beneﬁciaries. But, the model for delivering the
content of the project (manufacturing in this
case), and the enterprise selection criteria had
to be designed from scratch, as the existing
models and practices available within the re-
spective organizations were insuﬃcient to ad-
dress some of the basic goals of the project.
Based on our case study, we shall make an
attempt to verify whether the partnership model
met its exploitive and explorative objectives in
delivering the promised services within the given
timeframe and budget. Three basic business-
related indicators––cost, quality and delivery––
are utilized to carry out a comparative analysis
between the viability and eﬀectiveness of the
partnership as opposed to the traditional model
(Table 3).
(a) Cost
The partnership model, through the active
participation of the partners, provides free ac-
cess to services and advice that would otherwise
have to be purchased at market prices. The in-
kind contribution of the partners, a built-in
feature of the program as per the signed MoUs,
reduces the cost of the initiative.
(b) Delivery
Usually, the ultimate goal of a for-proﬁt or-
ganization taking part in a partnership is proﬁt:
a quantiﬁable, common and well-deﬁnable pa-
rameter in time. In nonproﬁt partnerships, the
Table 3. Comparative analysis of the two models based on selected indicators
Indicators Traditional model Partnership model
Cost Assistance purchased at
market prices
Portion of assistance provided by partners as in-
kind contribution
Speed of delivery At ‘‘bureaucratic’’ pace At ‘‘private sector’’ pace
Longer project formulation
period
Faster delivery to ensure timely achievement of
each partner’s objective
Results-oriented delivery
Shorter project formulation period given part-
ners’ contribution
Quality Assistance provided by Assistance provided by
––UNIDO staﬀ ––Partners, leaders in their areas of competence
––International/national
consultants identiﬁed by
UNIDO or recommended
by government
––International/national consultants identiﬁed
and endorsed by the partners
Supervision carried out by
UNIDO
Supervision carried out by the partners
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goal that drives partners is more diverse,
ranging from economic, social, environmental,
and intellectual to developmental returns. This
diversity entails a multitude of time and spatial
horizons. As a consequence, at least two con-
siderations support faster delivery in nonproﬁt
partnerships. At a macro level, the concept of
time is redeﬁned. To satisfy the most demand-
ing partner (e.g., private sector partner) a new
pace is introduced in the implementation of the
project. At the micro level, to achieve an equi-
table distribution of rewards, it is important
to comply with the established milestones and
meet each partner’s individual goals within the
agreed timeframe. This is feasible given the ac-
cess to and optimal utilization of the partners’
aggregate knowledge that eliminates the diag-
nosis and preparatory stages preceding the pro-
ject formulation and implementation phases. As
a result, we can ensure shorter project life cycle
and faster delivery of services to end beneﬁ-
ciaries. The business-like project management
approach demanded by the partners also an-
chors activities to concrete outcomes and re-
sults.
(c) Quality
The partners, leaders in their areas of com-
petence and with a vested interest in the out-
come of the project, guarantee a certain level of
quality by directly delivering a number of ser-
vices to end beneﬁciaries. At the same time,
they are involved in the selection of the pool of
experts entrusted with the delivery of special-
ized technical assistance. By closely monitoring
the quality of external assistance provided to
the SMEs and by promptly intervening or
voicing their concern in case of need, they also
perform the function of quality controllers.
(d) Correlations
A number of synergies are present among the
three parameters. First, we can detect major
cost savings as a result of the faster and more
eﬃcient delivery schedule and mechanism.
Second, there is an increase in the number of
services provided to end beneﬁciaries within the
given budget as a result of in-kind contribu-
tions that free up cash utilization. Third, we can
register enhanced customer satisfaction (SMEs)
given the speed of delivery. Finally, the quality
of services delivered increases as such services
cater to the speciﬁc needs of the major stake-
holders.
(e) Enterprise level
Due to lack of data, it is not possible to carry
out a comparative analysis on the impact of the
two models at the enterprise level. The part-
nership program was the ﬁrst UNIDO project
that closely monitored changes taking place at
the enterprises beneﬁting from the assistance.
The analysis of the results as illustrated in Ta-
ble 4 (based on the 20 enterprises) however,
demonstrates impressive improvements both in
terms of change in industrial culture and in-
crease in productivity and eﬃciency. Data and
information on several of the demonstration
enterprises more than a year after the comple-
tion of the program, show that assistance pro-
vided created the conditions for sustainable
improvements in terms of change in mind-set,
increase in client base, access to export mar-
kets, and increase in turnover.
(f) Relationship level
As a goal-oriented partnership, the partners
conﬁrmed the validity of the model as an al-
ternative and innovative way to deliver tech-
nical assistance to developing country SMEs
and their institutions. The government of India
expressed its continued support by requesting
UNIDO to expand its intervention in India. One
of UNIDO’s member states, the UK, praised
the initiative by ‘‘congratulating UNIDO and
its fellow partners on this program.’’ (UNIDO,
2000).
(g) Organizational level
From the organizational perspective, there is
a clear tradeoﬀ between quality and quantity.
Given the high level of staﬀ involvement in the
management of the partnership and the pro-
gram, the model ties up more staﬀ time than the
traditional approach. As a result, the capacity
to manage several projects simultaneously is
Table 4. Impact of the partnership model at enterprise
level in aggregate terms
Average reduction in lead-time 52%
Increase in shopﬂoor training from 0 to 238 h/
month
Drop in absenteeism 39%
Introduction of Standard Operating
Procedures
54%
Space savings 25%
Source: UNIDO (1999a).
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drastically reduced. On the other hand, close
and continuous interaction with the partners
and the end beneﬁciaries enhances the quality
of assistance and services as it ensures in-depth
understanding, constant ﬂow of information,
ﬁrst-hand learning opportunities, and prompt
intervention in case of need.
The ﬁrst phase of the program was com-
pleted as scheduled and within the estimated
budget. Compared to the traditional model, it
broke all records in terms of development, de-
livery and results dissemination time (one year
as opposed to an average of three years). The
limited budget provided to the program was
fully utilized with high impact at the enterprise
level. In conclusion it provided faster assistance
of a higher quality, at lower cost, thus meet-
ing the expectation of the partners, recipient
country and the end beneﬁciaries as compared
to the traditional model.
6. THE PARTNERSHIP MODEL:
FEATURES AND FACTORS FOR
SUCCESSFUL MANAGEMENT
As partnerships are about creating and sus-
taining relationships over time, new products or
services can be developed under such a scheme if
relationships are managed successfully. Sivadas
and Dwyer (2000) describe the development of
new products and services with alliances, and
posit that a diﬀerent set of management priori-
ties characterize successful new product and
service development from the management of a
successful alliance. They believe that coopera-
tive competency, which derives from mutual
adjustment, absorptive capacity and relational
capability, is a key driver of new product and
service development in alliances. We ﬁnd that
while cooperative competency is one of the
useful drivers of successful new product and
service development, the senior partner in the
innovation network has to develop a struc-
ture for the network and deﬁne the objectives
of the diﬀerent partners and the goal of the
project in concurrence and identify the roles
played by each of the key partners and sup-
porting partners. This structure development
phase should typically be carried out before
the goals of the project are set in stone, as the
structure often determines the success of the
project. Hence, time devoted to the preparation
of a partnership (partner selection, program
design and relationship building) helps build
mutual understanding on individual agendas
and common goals as well as highlighting the
diﬀerences between the partners to be bridged
over time.
Harris, Coles, and Dickenson (2000) describe
innovation networks with partners bringing in
diverse forms of expertise in new product de-
velopment, by focusing on a case study in the
defense electronics sector. They ﬁnd that while
developing innovation networks is useful for
developing competencies that do not lie within
the basic ﬁrm, often internal resources are spent
on building trust and managing various inter-
ﬁrm resources. In this section, we propose a
model for the successful management of the
possible synergies and conﬂicts that can de-
velop in managing an interﬁrm collaboration
eﬀort to achieve innovation, speciﬁcally when
each participating organization has its own ob-
jective. We examine the critical features and
factors that make or break the development of
new services in the context of nonproﬁt, multi-
disciplinary, public–private partnerships. Draw-
ing on the experience of our case, whereby
UNIDO is a not-for-proﬁt organization while
other partners are either for-proﬁt or nonproﬁt
organizations with other objectives than the
development of emerging markets, we present
our ﬁndings regarding key pre-formation, for-
mation, and post-formation challenges, each
crucial for the successful management of the
partnership and the innovation process.
(a) Pre-formation features: partnership and
partners proﬁle
(i) Selection of partners
Contrary to private partnerships where part-
ners are selected according to their market value
(e.g., potential or actual competitive advantage,
performance, etc.) most of the public partners
in a public–private partnership are a given part
of the equation. For example in UNIDO’s case,
due to the nature of the initiative there are
no obvious alternatives to partners such as the
host government and the national category
associations. These partners hold a unique po-
sition and at times cannot be excluded or con-
veniently replaced. Proxies may be identiﬁable
with more knowledge of the environment, and
after a critical review of each partner’s contri-
bution and value to the achievement of the ulti-
mate objective.
A common feature in developing economies
is lack of representation among socially (source
of employment) and economically (output)
signiﬁcant interest groups––small and micro
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enterprises––due to their fragmented structure.
To ensure equal opportunity and put in place a
mechanism to safeguard the interests of unor-
ganized groups, it is important for a private–
public partnership with development objectives
to recognize this vacuum and nominate a proxy
entity to represent them. In our case study,
ACMA represents medium to large automotive
component manufacturers, a majority of which
are Original Equipment Manufacturers (OEM)
suppliers. A number of stakeholders (e.g., UN-
IDO and the government of India) ensured due
consideration of the interests of the small and
micro enterprises by extending the program to
Tier 2 and 3 suppliers.
(ii) Size of partnership
It is reasonable to assume a correlation
between the number of partners and the com-
plexity of managing a multidisciplinary part-
nership given, among other things, diﬀerences
in partner agendas and organizational cultures.
The partnership model’s thrust is to provide a
holistic (as opposed to a compartmentalized)
and balanced solution to a speciﬁc problem. To
ensure the right climate, there is a need for a
critical, diversiﬁed and complementary mass of
experience, vision and opinion. Even though it
is tempting to keep the number of partners low
in order to keep the project management pro-
cess (e.g., decision-making and coordination)
simple and avoid alliance management related
delays, there is a need to relate the contribution
of each partner to the achievement of the ﬁnal
objective. The number of partners, contributing
to varying degrees and at diﬀerent stages to the
objective, is determined by the objective of the
initiative.
In the UNIDO case, the multidisciplinary
partnership was composed of seven private
and public partners. Bearing in mind the fact
that each partner’s contribution in terms of
input and resources enhances the learning op-
portunity in terms of transfer and understand-
ing of best practice, the partners had envisaged
inviting additional MNCs, leaders in the sec-
tor representing other industrial cultures (i.e.,
Japanese, American and Korean) to join the
project’s next phase.
(iii) The learning and unlearning process
Given the inﬂuence of initial conditions on
the growth dynamics of partnerships and the
disproportionate impact of misunderstandings
and early ‘‘small’’ events (Doz, 1996), it is
important to prepare partners for the public–
private partnership process. The track record
of collaboration with other organizations is
an indication of an organization’s position on
the learning curve. It is equally important to
carry out an ‘‘unlearning’’ process for tradi-
tional partners with a view to aligning expec-
tations with the new cooperation model as
opposed to past cooperation experience. For
example, in UNIDO’s case, for the new coop-
eration model to be successful it was crucial for
ACMA, ARAI and the Ministry of Industry to
comprehend the diﬀerence between a linear,
formal and bilaterally run technical assistance
program and a cyclical, informal, multilateral
one involving other parties. At the same time,
an ‘‘educational’’ period for partners with no
prior experience in operating in nonproﬁt en-
vironments, in the UNIDO case FIAT S.p.A.,
ensured an equal footing for the group. Once
the concept and various dimensions of the
nonproﬁt partnership are illustrated, it becomes
evident that, for example, yielding to the in-
terests of individual partners undermines the
raison d’e^tre of the cooperation model.
The partnership concept learning goes hand-
in-hand with behavioral learning. As Kanter
(1994) explains, building relationships is about
sharing (risks, costs, markets, information,
practices, technology, expertise, rewards etc.)
and not controlling, having open discussions
and dialogues, and being simultaneously teach-
ers and learners. The partners’ mindset deter-
mines the management style of the agreement
and the degree of learning and adaptation
possible at each interaction. There is a higher
chance of beating the odds if the partners em-
brace new working procedures and understand
the need to operate with a common set of val-
ues.
(iv) Context of partnership
UNIDO, by terming the partnership model
risky, did not integrate it into its activities and
hence avoided possible internal culture clashes.
Although the model was not integrated, the
driving members of the project had total deci-
sional power and were given control of key re-
sources, including seed resources to get the pilot
project started. Similar to risk-averse organi-
zations, UNIDO was keen to minimize the fall-
out of the partnership model in the event it did
not deliver the expected results. McIvor and
McHugh (2000) have addressed the issue of
change management needed in an organization
for successful implementation of a new partner-
ship model. They ﬁnd that extensive outsourcing
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and the adoption of more collaborative rela-
tions with other organizations for activities such
as product development, acts as a stimulus for
change within the organization. Based on their
research, they hypothesize that an integrated
approach needs to be taken in the management
of strategic change within the organization,
with senior managers adopting a pivotal role
as facilitators. While the best practices ob-
served in this case study agree at the broad level
with these results, we ﬁnd that during an ex-
perimental phase, it is better to maintain an
arms-length relationship between the manag-
ers responsible for the change, and the rest of
the organization. Once the change has been
formalized with the experiences of the new
product or service development team, the new
partnership model could be integrated back-
ward into the approach of the organization as
well as that of the partners. We also ﬁnd that
for such a model of ‘‘skunk works’’ to be suc-
cessful, some of the control variables for man-
aging the change have to be anticipated, and the
partners should be made ready to integrate
backwards the eﬀects of the change, if the ex-
periment (the partnership model) is regarded as
successful.
(b) Key formation features: six requirements for
a good ﬁt
(i) Resource dependency
The raison d’e^tre of a partnership lies in the
recognition by the partners of resource depen-
dency as elaborated by Pfeﬀer and Salanick
(1978): what can be achieved together can-
not be achieved alone. The track record of col-
laboration with other organizations is a valid
indication of the importance each partner at-
taches to cooperation and cross-organizational
learning.
In the UNIDO case, although the partners
had a track record of past cooperation with
each other or with other organizations, there
were times when some of the partners lost sight
of the value of a holistic approach and collec-
tive action.
(ii) Commitment symmetry
Similar to any type of intra or interﬁrm col-
laboration, commitment at the highest level of
the partners’ organizations sets the stage for the
collaboration. For the agreement to come alive,
the same level of commitment and involvement
is expected from the operational staﬀ involved
in the implementation of the initiative. Right
from the outset, feeling of ownership can be
instilled among the operational teams through
their involvement in the design stage of the
agreement followed by direct execution. Direct
implementation enhances the probability for
success as staﬀ, intimately familiar with the
organizational cultures and strategic intents, is
made responsible for the deliverables. Partners’
equal commitment, conﬁrmed through ade-
quate allocation of time and resources, will
guarantee reciprocal appreciation and create
opportunities for synergies among the partners.
Commitment symmetry was the backbone of
the UNIDO partnership program. The project
was launched by the highest authorities of each
organization and actively sought the partici-
pation of the operational staﬀ in its design and
execution.
(iii) Performance symmetry
A crucial feature of a multidisciplinary
partnership is mutual cooperation among the
partners. This can be achieved if each partner’s
contribution to the outcome of the initiative is
equally valued. This will occur if each partner
exhibits strong and equal leadership in its area
of competence through provision of expertise,
tools, methodologies or political weight required
to support and achieve the program objective.
To ensure performance symmetry, UNIDO
‘‘cherry-picked’’ its partners with due attention
to their achievements and reputation in their
respective ﬁelds.
(iv) Common goal symmetry
A partnership aims to leverage on the com-
parative knowledge and advantage of each
partner to provide a package of eﬀective and
sustainable solutions. While the partners com-
plement and supplement each other by per-
forming their roles and responsibilities, each
seeks a beneﬁt in terms of meeting its speciﬁc
goal and objectives. To ensure achievement of
the program’s objective, individual goals have
to be an output or subset of the overall pro-
gram objective. Lack of goal symmetry may
lead to the dismantlement of the partnership, as
foreseen initially, with adverse consequences on
the delivery schedule.
Ideally, the roles, responsibilities, and bene-
ﬁts of each partner and their constituencies are
determined upon concurrence on the common
objective. The framework of cooperation (ex-
pectation and commitments: in-kind, ﬁnancial
and human resources) can be summarized in a
legally time-bound document such as an MoU.
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To set the ground for an organic growth of the
partnership based on the evolution of the re-
lationship, it is best for such documents to be
drafted internally, kept simple, and ﬂexible.
As described earlier, UNIDO, depending on
the partner, signed umbrella or project-speciﬁc
bilateral agreements with each of the partners
describing the general framework and mini-
mum expectation and commitments. The doc-
uments, given their low level of detail and legal
implications, were drafted internally and re-
viewed by the legal departments of each partner
organization.
(v) Cultural appreciation symmetry
While the objective of the partnership clari-
ﬁes the number of desirable partners, the scope
and geographical coverage of the initiative help
identify the required cultural background of the
partners. For a partnership to work, it is im-
portant for each partner to be able to relate and
have equal appreciation, respect and under-
standing of the program’s cultural environment
and the partners’ cultural diﬀerences.
In our example, UNIDO is a multilateral
organization with an international staﬀ that has
working experience in developing countries.
The multinational partner, FIAT S.p.A., has
worldwide operations under diﬀerent schemes
including a long-standing presence in India.
INSEAD has an international vocation (staﬀ
and students), a dual-campus structure in Eu-
rope and Asia and collaboration arrangements
with universities across the continents. Similar
to the other international partners, the PWBLF
has global coverage, a number of on-going
programs in India and a cooperation agreement
with the UN.
(vi) Converging working cultures
A partnership is designed to bring together
and integrate disparate sets of intellectual cap-
ital and working habits. It creates a new and
unique community that has no experience (or a
diﬀerent experience) of working together. To
enable the partnership team to communicate,
work and decide across their respective orga-
nizational boundaries it is best to set up simple,
ﬂat and parallel structures. To level out diﬀer-
ences in working style and culture, it is best to
jointly develop a set of working practices and
procedures.
UNIDO had an informal and passive ap-
proach towards the partnership’s working cul-
ture: practices were established along the way
and situations were handled as they arose. Time
spent in ironing out the diﬀerences at the outset
would have been beneﬁcial.
(c) Post-formation conditions: six conditions to
make it work
(i) Leadership: key to success
Eﬀective leadership is necessary in any con-
text but is even more pronounced in the case of
multilateral partnerships. To avoid any of the
partners, representing a speciﬁc interest group,
taking the lead in the implementation of the
program, it is best to confer the role of manager
on a ‘‘neutral’’ partner who can freely negotiate
and operate bearing in mind the common ob-
jective of the agreement. In our case, UNIDO,
the only ‘‘neutral’’ partner, led and managed
the program.
The role of the partnership manager in a
multidisciplinary public–private partnership is
complex, demanding and may require undi-
vided attention. It is thus counterproductive to
change performing managers during the course
of the agreement as continuity supports stabil-
ity. It is clear that what will eventually make
the diﬀerence among equally capable managers
is their level of experience in running similar
types of agreements.
Diplomatic, entrepreneurial, negotiation, in-
tegration, persuasion, and emphatic skills are
only some of the necessary skills of a partner-
ship manager. There are also a number of roles
(designer, facilitator, teacher and student) that
a good manager has to play simultaneously in
order to successfully establish, maintain and
nurture relationships and eﬀectively execute
agreements (MacAvoy, 1997). The manager
should carry out upfront analytical work with a
view to optimize the decision and implementa-
tion process concerning the various stages (pre-
formation, formation, and post-formation) of
the partnership process and propose win–win
situations to all parties. In a nodal governance
structure, the manager needs to take the lead
in policy formulation, role and responsibil-
ity deﬁnition, relationship building, partnership
identity, and legacy creation. In UNIDO’s case,
the originator of the model had a pronounced
leadership talent and played this role eﬀectively
and successfully until the completion of the
pilot phase.
(ii) Partnership team
For the partnership to go into the opera-
tional phase, each partner has to designate staﬀ
to the implementation of the program. The
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level of partner commitment will determine the
quality of human resources attached to the ini-
tiative. The number of staﬀ involved will largely
depend on the nature and requirements of the
initiative. As building relationships is the core,
changes in the partnership team or its member
composition will have some eﬀect on the part-
nership.
In the UNIDO case, a dedicated partnership
team was set up enabling the development of
interpersonal relationships. As far as UNIDO
itself was concerned, the initiative was run from
idea to results by a small, entrepreneurial,
young, internal team. The opportunity to relate
to the partners and appreciate each position
was equally shared by the manager and the
partnership team. There was a match between
the team’s size and program requirements. The
above setting enabled the eﬀective testing of the
model. All partners except one kept the same
composition during the ﬁrst year, thus ensuring
continuity and stability.
(iii) Intensive communication
As the likelihood of a multidisciplinary,
crosscultural partnership being in one physical
location is low, it is crucial to make intensive use
of various communication means as well as
cross-visits to ensure continuous contribution
and input from each partner. Intensive com-
munication and open discussion of issues creates
the required transparency in the decision-mak-
ing process and leads to partner conﬁdence and
a trust-building process. The socialization pro-
cess has numerous advantages including that of
facilitating both the tacit and explicit learning
process.
Intensive communication is a time-consum-
ing activity. In the UNIDO case, it reduced the
opportunity for the UNIDO staﬀ to run dif-
ferent projects simultaneously. It was however
fundamental in the dissemination of real-time
information that hastened and facilitated the
decision-making process.
(iv) Consensus-building approach
The consensus-building approach practiced
during the decision-making process is crucial
for the formulation of balanced solutions to the
set of problems identiﬁed. This process gives
the program the required ﬂexibility and creates
an interactive environment that enables the
development and experimentation of new ideas.
In this context, negotiations and other decision-
making processes are regarded as powerful
sessions to reach the best available solution.
The pursuit of this approach, as opposed to a
top-to-bottom process, strengthens the feeling
of ownership among the partners and heightens
the level of commitment and trust.
The consensus-building approach was one of
the cornerstones of the UNIDO model. Major
decisions were made only with the involvement
of all partners. To ensure the participation of
the Indian counterpart institutions and gov-
ernment in the process, critical meetings were
organized mainly in India.
(v) Immediate implementation
Conﬁdence in the importance of the agree-
ment is reinforced once it becomes operational.
Immediate implementation avoids any disen-
gagement, especially among skeptical partners
and their respective staﬀ. The UNIDO part-
nership model entered the implementation
phase almost one month after the signing of the
MoUs between the partners, hence signaling
full commitment on the part of the organiza-
tion.
(vi) Alignment of cooperation learning
capability
Carayannis, Alexander, and Ioannidis (2000)
have found that collaborative research part-
nerships between government, industry and
university actors is facilitated by the sharing of
knowledge across organizational boundaries,
which promotes the formation of trusted rela-
tionships and builds social capital for further
innovation. Both private and nonproﬁt players
can beneﬁt from these interactions, as they can
learn how to design intelligent trans-organiza-
tional knowledge interfaces to ensure that
knowledge-sharing occurs across organiza-
tional boundaries. The authors state examples
from around the world, where the partnerships
create new trans-organizational knowledge
structures to facilitate the ﬂow of ideas, infor-
mation and innovation between sectors of the
economy.
While two conditions, admittance and intent
to learn through a partnership (resource de-
pendency), can be taken for granted as an in-
dication of the partners’ good will, the ability
and capability of a partner to learn is a variable
which is subject to change over the lifecycle
of the partnership. If the diﬀerential learning
rates among the partners are neglected and not
addressed, it may lead to the dissolution of
the partnership or exclusion of a partner. To
assess the situation, benchmarking each part-
ner’s learning rate with the partnership’s
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knowledge creation rate can be an eﬀective
tool.
In the event of diﬀerential learning rates, to
assure the healthy growth of the partnership it
is important to support and level out the
learning process among the partners and ensure
convergence in learning skills and speed.
Moving at the pace of the lowest denomina-
tor––the slowest or least interested learner––
remains a nonoption as it defeats the potential
of the partnership model as an explorative ini-
tiative.
The UNIDO initiative as experimented in
India, suﬀered to a certain extent from diﬀer-
ential learning rates among the partners. Eﬀorts
would have been necessary to ensure conver-
gence in learning skills and speed, particularly
among the traditional partners.
7. CONCLUSION AND IMPLICATIONS
In this paper we presented the development
of a new service––the partnership model––by a
nonproﬁt organization within the UN system,
UNIDO. First, we illustrated the innovative
nature of the service followed by an analysis of
the model’s viability from the various stake-
holders’ perspective. Bearing in mind that
partnerships cannot substitute for good inter-
nal operations, we have demonstrated the va-
lidity of the model from the private and public
sector partners’ as well as the end beneﬁciaries’
(SMEs) point of view. We also included some
cautious remarks on how it may be perceived
by the donor community. Based on our obser-
vations and drawing upon the literature, we
proceeded with summarizing the key factors
and features crucial for the successful man-
agement of similar nonproﬁt, multidisciplinary,
public–private partnerships. By outlining some
of the best practices from the case study, we
recommended close interaction among the part-
ners in the development and execution of the
objectives, as well as illustrated some mecha-
nisms to align the incentives of the diﬀerent
partners.
In short, for a full year, UNIDO operated as
an ambidextrous organization (Tushman &
O’Reilly III, 1999). It pushed ahead with its
revamped traditional model and at the same
time experimented with a ‘‘skunk works’’ style
initiative, the partnership model. The initiative
ran from idea to results by a small, entrepre-
neurial, and young internal team with a tight
delivery schedule and limited ﬁnancial re-
sources. It was born out of individual skills and
knowledge and had a strong tacit dimension.
To a large extent insulated from the organiza-
tion’s mainstream activities, this ‘‘skunk works’’
was far from being an organic innovation.
Against this background, we conclude by rais-
ing our concerns about the sustainability of this
innovation process at the organizational level
as well as that of the model itself at the orga-
nizational and country level.
Similar to other nonproﬁt organizations,
UNIDO, with scarce resources, is expected to
deliver services to its constituencies. It does not
have the mandate, structure, resources, pro-
cesses, pressure, experience or the incentive to
propose and pursue innovative approaches. As
a result, innovation is a haphazard event that
may simply stem from an individual’s willing-
ness to experiment with new ideas while im-
plementing speciﬁc programs.
The sustainability of the partnership model
within the organization faces yet another series
of obstacles. Drawing upon the literature on
knowledge transfer and more speciﬁcally Szu-
lanski’s (1994) checklist on intraﬁrm transfer of
best practices, 5 we could have evaluated the
level of diﬃculty facing UNIDO in overcoming
resistance to integrating the model into its
mainstream activity. But, the members of the
small team who were the source of innovation
as well as tacit and explicit knowledge, left the
organization before any systematic attempt was
made at capturing and transferring the best
practices required to run similar initiatives. As
a result, plans for the next phase as envisaged
by the original team and the partners did not
materialize. After a year of quasi nonactivity,
the original MNC partner opted to put an end
to its collaboration with the organization under
the partnership ﬂagship.
As demonstrated in our case study, the con-
tinuation, replication and adoption of a new
paradigm in the same or other contexts (coun-
tries and sectors), however successful though
experimental in nature, is far from automatic
both at the organization’s as well as the country
level. In our case study, UNIDO, by recogniz-
ing the validity of the model is pursuing a
number of initiatives to integrate the model
into its mainstream activities. More speciﬁcally,
the organization aims to ensure the continua-
tion of the program in India, extend its col-
laboration with other MNCs operating in
various sectors, and experiment with the model
in other emerging countries. At the country
level, to ensure the sustainability of the new
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model, it would be helpful to identify a process
owner among the national counterpart institu-
tions or government departments upfront as a
means to ensure a certain degree of continuity
upon the ‘‘departure’’ of the leading organiza-
tion.
NOTES
1. Kanter (1999, p. 122)
2. The United Nations Industrial Development Orga-
nization (UNIDO), established in 1966 with headquar-
ters in Vienna, is a specialized UN agency that deals
exclusively with industry from a development perspec-
tive. Similar to other UN agencies, its services are
nonproﬁt, neutral, specialized and funded by donor
countries or other sister agencies.
3. Carlos Magari~nos, UNIDO director-general, March
1999 (UNIDO, 1999b).
4. UNIDO (1999a).
5. Absorptive capacity of the recipient, level of under-
standing of the practice, quality of the relationship
between the source and the recipient, support in the
organizational context, motivation of the source, moti-
vation of the recipient.
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